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UNDERSTANDING DISCRIMINATION IN THE SCORED 
SOCIETY 
Tal Z. Zarsky* 
INTRODUCTION: KEEPING SCORE OF THE SCORED SOCIETY 
In The Scored Society,1 Professors Danielle Citron and Frank 
Pasquale introduce a troubling reality: a society in which a small yet 
powerful group of individuals makes crucial decisions regarding a broad 
segment of the public. Such decisions are reached on the basis of a 
scoring scheme the group members secretly develop in advance. This 
seemingly arbitrary and possibly automated scoring process2 allows 
powerful entities3 to quickly and seamlessly promote their objectives 
while treating similar individuals differently. The scoring process also 
unfolds in a manner which is incomprehensible to those whom it affects. 
The description above is not of a distant dystopia. Rather, it is of a 
society we are quickly entering—or perhaps, as a technology 
commentator recently noted in a similar context—“sleepwalking into.”4 
Scoring has been carried out for years in the realm of consumer 
* Professor of Law, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law. I thank Courtney Bowman, James Rule, 
Susan Freiwald, Mireille Hildebrandt, Joris van Hoboken, Serge Gutwirth, and Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler for comments on previous versions of this work. Some of the ideas here discussed were 
presented at the Privacy Legal Scholars Conference, 2011, a Faculty Workshop at IVIR (University 
of Amsterdam) (September, 2011), and the LSTS Workshop at the Vrije University in Brussels 
(September, 2011). In all these instances, participants provided excellent comments. I also thank 
Eyal Mashbetz for his research assistance. Research for this paper was partially funded by an NWO 
(the Dutch Research Foundation) grant titled: “Data Mining without Discrimination” and I thank my 
co-researchers Bart Custers, Bart Schermer, and Toon Calders for their insights. 
1. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
2. For this Article, I rely on Citron and Pasquale’s description of the process, as follows: 
“Predictive algorithms mine personal information to make guesses about individuals’ likely actions 
and risks. A person’s on- and offline activities are turned into scores that rate them above or below 
others. Private and public entities rely on predictive algorithmic assessments to make important 
decisions about individuals.” Id. at 3. 
3. Id. at 3–4 (noting the discussion in terms of “power”). The article also notes “mutual-scoring 
opportunities” and instances in which “individuals can score the scorers” but note that more often 
the situation is reversed. Id. at 3.  
4. Evgeny Morozov, The Real Privacy Problem, 116 MIT TECH. REV. 32, 37 (2014), available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/520426/the-real-privacy-problem/. 
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credit. Yet the age of big data is leading to the dissemination of these 
practices to many other contexts. The scoring practices are rendered a 
feasible option in business, governmental, and social settings due to a 
multitude of effects.5 Scoring is made possible given the availability of 
vast quantities of personal information, collection of which is enabled by 
changes in business models, and the ever-lower price of digital storage 
facilities. It is further enhanced by advances in data analytics and the 
ability to effectively aggregate data. 
The accelerating use of scoring brings about a variety of problems, 
which Professors Citron and Pasquale elegantly and eloquently detail. 
As they demonstrate, the problems related to the expansion of the scored 
society can be understood on a basic and deeper, analytical level. On the 
basic level, these processes are problematic given the vast amount of 
complaints they generate,6 and the fact that they are used, at times, to the 
detriment of the individual.7 Here, Professors Citron and Pasquale refer 
to use of credit scores to allocate loans as a case in point.8 On an 
analytical level, the nature of these concerns could be linked to the way 
the process relies on biased and inaccurate datasets,9 its inherent 
opacity,10 or the lack of sufficient human review.11 
Yet another important concern surfacing in discussions and analyses 
of the scored society and the troubles big data analytics bring about is 
that of discrimination. In this Article, I begin to examine the relation 
between discrimination-based arguments and the emergence of the 
scored society.12 I also briefly examine what solutions could be applied 
to limit such concerns. This inquiry comes at a crucial time. The 
discrimination-based argument is already being examined and invoked 
when addressing the realm of scoring and big data by both academics 
5. For a discussion of the rise of these dynamics almost a decade ago, see Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine 
Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining of Personal 
Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003). 
6. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
7. Id. at 4. 
8. Id.  
9. Id.  
10. Id. at 11.  
11. Id. at 20 (noting that at times the systems take on a life of their own).  
12. As explained throughout this Article, discrimination doctrine has severe shortcomings. It is 
also so often applied that we might be witnessing “discrimination fatigue,” and perhaps it is best we 
opt for broader theories and justifications such as human dignity. See Kenji Yoshino, The New 
Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 795 (2011). Yet given the salience of discrimination as a 
concept in the already existing discourse, it is important to engage in an analytical discussion as to 
its proper meaning.  
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and policymakers.13 Specifically, a recent Request for Public Comment 
set out by the Department of Commerce (via the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration) sought advice 
regarding the issues arising that involve discrimination and Big Data.14 
Yet there is much analytical work to be done before such arguments 
could be properly articulated in this ever-changing context. Perhaps most 
importantly, scholarship must connect the policy arguments and popular 
discontent noted in the context of scoring and big data analytics, with 
sound theoretical arguments voiced elsewhere while discussing 
discrimination.15 Such work is critical, as it distinguishes between valid 
concerns and those that merely result from a Neo-Luddite sentiment or 
even manipulation by various interest holders.16 
This Article draws out several antidiscrimination paradigms which on 
their face pertain to the dynamics discussed in The Scored Society, and 
big data in general. Such analysis allows for recognizing which 
discrimination-based concerns are especially acute in the scored society, 
as well as setting forth initial proposed responses for mitigating them, 
when possible. The Article proceeds as follows: after a brief 
Introduction mapping the confines of the debate and summarizing 
Professor Citron and Pasquale’s contributions, the Article moves to 
Part I, where it generally addresses the notion of “discrimination” and its 
relevance to the issue at hand. Part II—the heart of this Article—
identifies the discrimination-based concerns which relate to the 
mistreatment of “protected groups.”17 There, the Article demonstrates 
the possible concerns while relying on race as a key example of a 
13. In the academic context (beyond The Scored Society), see generally Solon Barocas & Andrew 
D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2477899. In the policy realm, see EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: 
SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 51 (2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf. For a recent discussion in the 
New York Times which involves both academia and policy, see Seeta Peña Gangadharan et al., 
Room for Debate: Is Big Data Spreading Inequality?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014, 12:22 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/06/is-big-data-spreading-inequality/the-dangers-
of-high-tech-profiling-using-big-data. 
14. Big Data and Consumer Privacy in the Internet Economy, 79 Fed. Reg. 32714 (June 6, 2014). 
15. Discrimination indeed cannot be reduced to one theory. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 473 (2001).  
16. For discussions of instances where these were indeed the reasons for concerns regarding 
technology in general, see K.A. Taipale, Technology, Security and Privacy: The Fear of 
Frankenstein, The Mythology of Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 138 
(2005). 
17. “Protected groups” is a term of art broadly applied in the discrimination discourse. See infra 
text accompanying note 49; infra text accompanying notes 103–105. 
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“protected group” and distinguishing between explicit discrimination, 
implicit discrimination, and instances of disparate impact. In Part III, the 
Article takes a brief look at selected discrimination concerns which go 
beyond protected groups. It generally finds these latter problems 
relatively easy to resolve. Finally, in the Conclusion, the Article argues 
that even though the scoring process is seemingly ridden with 
discrimination-based concerns, it certainly should not be categorically 
abandoned, as it might even promote antidiscrimination objectives when 
carried out properly. 
The Scored Society provides an excellent point to begin an important 
discussion regarding the novel forms of discrimination the analysis of 
big data brings about. Indeed, Professors Citron and Pasquale make the 
crucial link between the emergence of scoring practices and a variety of 
troubling concerns—including discrimination.18F18 Yet their article does 
not settle for merely pointing out problematic aspects. Professors Citron 
and Pasquale go even farther and offer innovative solutions.19F19 They 
promote regulatory oversight through the introduction of licensing 
schemes,20F20 audit logs 21F21 and mandatory test-runs of the scoring methods, 
using various data sets.22F22 They also recommend the use of interactive 
modeling interfaces which allow those subjected to the scoring process 
to gain a greater understanding of its inner workings. 23F23 This objective 
could be achieved by allowing users to challenge the system with 
various hypothetical scenarios and examine the responses they receive.24F24 
The various harms, concerns, and even solutions discussed throughout 
The Scored Society can be easily grounded in several existing moral and 
legal concepts. The most obvious choice is integrating the analysis of 
scoring into a broader discussion regarding privacy and data protection 
(or the lack thereof) in the digital age. Indeed, many of The Scored 
Society’s concerns can be articulated through the terminology of the 
“Fair Information Practices”—or FIPs. FIPs are broad regulatory 
concepts set forth by several influential entities, most notably, the 
OECD. 25F25 Both the European Union and the United States incorporated 
18. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 13–15.  
19. Similar solutions were also set forth by others in the broader “Big Data” context. See VIKTOR 
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 171–84 (2014). 
20. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 21–22.  
21. Id. at 28. 
22. Id. at 25.  
23. Id. at 28–29. 
24. Id.  
25. OECD Privacy Principles, OECDPRIVACY.ORG (Aug. 9, 2010), http://oecdprivacy.org/. For a 
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FIPs, to some extent, into their privacy laws.26 FIPs spell out what 
obligations those collecting and using personal information have towards 
their users and “data subjects.” For instance, an individual’s inability to 
view personal data collected about her while creating the score is related 
to the principle of “Individual Participation.”27 The fear that said 
scoring-related information is inaccurate or incomplete is linked to the 
principle of “Data Quality.”28 Finally, the overall theme which calls for 
greater disclosure in the scoring process is closely related to the 
principles of “Transparency” and “Openness.”29 
Furthermore, the innovative solutions Professors Citron and Pasquale 
provide fit nicely with other regulatory proposals set forth in the privacy 
and data protection realm to achieve similar objectives. Most notable in 
this context is the European Union’s Data Protection Regulation 
Proposal. This proposed legislation introduces novel and even 
controversial measures to enhance FIPs, such as “the right to be 
forgotten,” mandatory interoperability, a guarantee for human evaluation 
and hefty fines, among others.30 To some extent, integrating these 
proposed solutions, especially those calling for enhanced disclosure and 
enforcement, into existing law will allow for overcoming the various 
concerns regarding inaccuracy and opacity which the scored society 
brings about. 
Yet beyond the notion of privacy and data protection, the discussion 
at hand invokes an additional set of concerns, which call for a serious 
discussion regarding discrimination.31 Indeed, Professors Citron and 
Pasquale note that the scoring process, especially when used to 
formulate credit scores, can prove discriminatory, have a disparate 
recent discussion of the formulation of Fair Information Practices (FIPs), see Robert Gellman, Fair 
Information Practices: A Basic History, ROBERT GELLMAN: PRIVACY & INFO. POL’Y CONSULTANT 
(Aug. 3, 2014), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf. 
26. See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry 
Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 15 (2001). 
27. OECD Privacy Principles, supra note 25. 
28. Id.  
29. Id. 
30. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council: On 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf. 
31. For a discussion as to the relation between antidiscrimination and data protection law, see 
Raphaël Gellert et al., A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Discrimination and Data Protection 
Legislations, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: DATA MINING AND 
PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES 61, 61–89 (Bart Custers et al. eds., 2013). 
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impact,32 and even allow for “systemizing” discrimination.33 They also 
note that scoring systems are stigmatizing34—a term often used in 
conjunction with discrimination.35 These negative outcomes can result 
from deliberate or accidental actions of the scoring entities.36 Thus, a 
solid link between the concerns stemming from the scored society and 
the broader concept of discrimination is apparent. However, policy-
makers and scholars must engage in additional work on the theoretical 
and policy level to further incorporate insights from the 
antidiscrimination discourse into the emerging realm of “scoring.” It is 
also important to recognize the limits of antidiscrimination theory, and 
the point at which referring to this concept will not prove helpful. 
Before proceeding, note an important methodological caveat. The 
analysis below focuses on the concept of discrimination in theory, as 
opposed to discrimination law and doctrine. Indeed, in many instances, 
existing laws provide important points of guidance and insight. Yet 
given the very dynamic nature of the context here discussed, the current 
analysis is almost exclusively theoretical, leaving a doctrinal analysis for 
another day.37 This analytical strategy could be partially justified by 
noting that the laws and regulations which will address these settings in 
the near future have yet to be written. Thus, merely focusing on concepts 
is acceptable. Relying on concepts rather than doctrine provides for the 
questionable liberty to crop together arguments set forth in scholarship 
related to the constitutional aspects of discrimination (which mostly 
pertain to the actions of the state), and those invoking civil rights (which 
also pertain to private parties) into one analytical discussion. 
The analysis, therefore, strives to establish an acceptable form of 
conduct in the scored society, while relying on a normative standard 
which must govern the actions of the firms engaged in scoring. 
Formulating such a standard in the context of discrimination is, however, 
extremely difficult. Explaining discrimination, as Professor Larry 
Alexander notes, “is much more difficult than most people assume.”38 
There is no full blown normative theory of discrimination, as Alexander 
32. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 5. 
33. Id. at 13.  
34. Id. at 7. 
35. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES 3 (2006).  
36. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 24.  
37. For a recent discussion of some of the doctrinal issues these practices bring about, see 
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 13, at 23–43.  
38. Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151 
(1992).  
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further explains, but rather a “messy blend of deontological and 
consequentialist considerations.”39 Given that this Article addresses the 
actions of private parties, the law must also provide such entities with 
the autonomy and ability to exercise their preferences. Finding fault in 
actions which rely upon these preferences should usually be coupled 
with not only a negative outcome, but with negative intentions. Yet 
given the severity of some actions, this general rule has exceptions. 
Rather than beginning this discussion by setting out the overall theory 
of justice this Article will rely upon, the analysis notes several 
antidiscrimination justifications throughout the discussion. Some focus 
on the wrong of a discriminatory decision, while others focus on the 
wrong of a discriminatory outcome. These normative baselines are 
briefly detailed separately in the chapters to follow. This strategy is 
crucial to properly explain the very different discrimination-based 
challenges the scored society brings about, and the manner in which they 
might be resolved. 
I. SCORING, DISCRIMINATING 
The Scored Society identifies the fear of discrimination as part of a 
broader set of concerns such a society sets forth.40F40 Discrimination is a 
fundamental, yet illusive concept. In a scored society, individuals who 
are seemingly similar are treated differently when they receive different 
scores. Furthermore, they are subsequently allocated different benefits.41F41 
However, applying the concept of discrimination to the “scoring” 
discussion brings about several wrinkles. In addition, the questions as to 
how we might resolve these concerns and take anti-discriminatory action 
calls for a different and specific set of tools. 
Discrimination is a broad term, which has generated a breadth of legal 
thought and case law. It is also a charged term, which triggers visceral 
reactions and responses. Discussing discrimination quickly leads to 
considering racial discrimination and other repugnant practices of the 
past. Such discussions also commonly call for seeking out 
discriminatory intent.42 Yet, discussing discrimination in the context of 
39. Id. at 154. In his important analysis of discrimination-related issues, Schauer also explains 
that rather than selecting a “moral standpoint at the outset” he chooses to explore a diverse 
collection of topics, while examining the intuitions and arguments which apply to them. SCHAUER, 
supra note 35, at 24. 
40. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 7, 13–15, 31, 33.  
41. Id. at 5. 
42. Indeed, intent is required in terms of applying the Equal Protection Clause. See Alexander, 
supra note 38, at 179. 
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the scored society challenges existing thought paradigms. It calls for 
closely examining what form of racial or intended discrimination is 
indeed occurring. It also requires inquiring whether other forms of 
discrimination should be prohibited and perhaps more importantly, why. 
A preliminary note must address a puzzled reader’s initial concerns.43 
This hypothetical reader might argue that discrimination-related 
problems are of limited relevance in the scored society; discrimination 
pertains to instances in which those that should be treated as equal are 
not treated as such. In addition, discrimination transpires when those that 
are different are treated the same. However, the scoring dynamics allow 
for treating different individuals differently. Indeed the entire scoring 
system is premised upon locating differences and using them to generate 
unique responses. Therefore, the scored society does not enhance 
discrimination, but equality instead! 
Yet this view mischaracterizes both the scoring process and the 
proper meaning of anti-discrimination policy. Antidiscrimination policy 
is not only about assuring equal treatment to equals, but also about 
assuring that specific differences among individuals should be ignored.44 
Furthermore, the principles of antidiscrimination policy go beyond 
making choices among individuals and pertain to removing social 
frameworks of inequality from society. In addition, the scoring 
mechanism should not be viewed as a neutral and precise measure. 
While it indeed strives to scientifically distinguish between the different 
and unequal, it at times systematically errs in doing so. Instead of 
identifying differences, the scoring system might even create and 
reinforce them. For these reasons and others, the discussion of 
discrimination set out below is surely warranted. 
The following analysis distinguishes between various forms of 
discrimination-based arguments. It begins by distinguishing between 
discrimination against protected groups (the definition of which will be 
briefly discussed below) and other forms of discrimination. Many of 
these arguments are also stated in The Scored Society. Yet it is crucial to 
distinguish among them, and point out the relative strengths and limits 
of each one. 
Before proceeding, a few brief notes and caveats are required 
regarding the specific role discrimination plays in the analysis to follow. 
This discussion focuses on the fairness-related aspects of discrimination, 
43. This assumption is also noted in passing in The Scored Society. Citron & Pasquale, supra 
note 1, at 4.  
44. SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 215. 
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without accounting for the relationship the concept of discrimination has 
with efficiency. Indeed, in many instances, discrimination might be 
inefficient and thus present an unsustainable business or social 
practice.45 In other instances, discrimination might be cost-beneficial 
given the business settings in which the firms operate, and thus prove 
everlasting.46 Yet discrimination-based concerns are relevant regardless 
of the specifics of the efficiency-based analysis because they are 
premised on the concepts of fairness and justice. Indeed, in many cases, 
the economic benefits discriminatory conduct provides cannot 
compensate for the moral wrongs it involves. Furthermore, even if the 
discriminatory effects of scoring are merely an inefficient phase the 
market is due to correct, one could deem these effects morally 
unacceptable, even in the short run. Notably, at times, current law sets a 
balance in which some forms of discriminatory conduct may be justified 
given their benefits, yet such actions might be still considered 
discriminatory nonetheless.47 
In addition, the following discussion is premised upon several non-
trivial assumptions regarding the scoring process. First, that the scores 
formulated, which are premised upon the individuals’ previous 
behaviors, rely upon previously noted non-spurious correlations between 
individual attributes and problematic behaviors the process is trying to 
predict. (A default, a risk, or poor work performance are some key 
examples.) The correlations will not be universal; the scoring processes 
will never be able to indicate that when specific social variables meet 
specified criteria, a future event pertaining to human behavior is sure to 
occur. In the social sciences—the context which relates to the scoring of 
humans this Article addresses, and as opposed to rules of physics—
universal correlations are quite rare.48 A prediction made by a scoring 
scheme will always include an inherent chance of error. However, I here 
45. See Zarsky, supra note 5, at 25 n.73 (referencing relevant work by Ian Ayres and Gary 
Becker).  
46. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car 
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 843–45 (1991). Ayers introduces several forms of statistical 
theories of discrimination, such as cost-based and revenue-based discrimination. The former refers 
to seller’s inferences that specific types of consumers impose additional costs on the firm and 
therefore should be avoided, while the latter refers to cases in which the sellers draw inferences 
regarding the revenue which could be derived from different customers given their specific traits 
and therefore charge higher prices. Id. 
47. For instance, in the context of employment and Title VII antidiscrimination provisions, 
disparate impact is not prohibited if it can be explained by a business necessity. 42 U.S.C., § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A) (2012).  
48. See Alexander, supra note 38, at 168 (discussing this distinction).  
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assume that when a scoring scheme is relied upon, the error level 
pertaining to the schemes involved will be below a specific, acceptable, 
threshold. This threshold level might be dictated by either economic 
forces or direct governmental intervention. Assuring that the scoring 
firms meet this requirement is easier said than done, yet I set aside the 
discussions as to its enforcement for another day. 
A second assumption regarding the scoring process assumes that the 
scoring protocols dictated by the analysis of historical statistical data are 
indeed followed through diligently. At times, those vested with the 
authority to operate the scoring schemes might feel the urge to tinker 
with the mechanism at their own discretion. Such tinkering might lead to 
various abuses, discrimination, unfair outcomes for the affected 
individuals, and even financial loss for the relevant firms. To sidestep 
these problematic aspects of a scoring dynamic, the Article assumes that 
the scoring schemes structured by statisticians in the back office are 
indeed followed to a tee by those in the field. Again, an analysis as to 
how this might be achieved, and whether such an objective is indeed 
achievable is beyond this current discussion. 
II. SCORING AND THE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
PROTECTED GROUPS 
A. Overview and Explicit Discrimination 
Discrimination against “protected groups” is probably the most salient 
analytical framework within antidiscrimination law, and with good 
reason. Generally speaking, this form of discrimination pertains to 
instances in which the scoring mechanism implicates members of 
protected groups as higher risks (or inflicts other negative attributes) at a 
higher rate than others outside these groups. Naturally, this is established 
while accounting for the groups’ proportional size in society.49 Such 
discriminatory conduct subjects members of the protected groups to 
burdens and hardships other groups do not suffer. It also leads to 
additional, secondary repercussions.50 
The correct definition and extent of protected groups is a difficult and 
thorny question. The United States Supreme Court has recognized a very 
limited number of “protected groups,” such as those classified by race, 
49. Achieving this analytical task is obviously easier said than done. See Barocas & Selbst, supra 
note 13, at 32 (noting the “four-fifths rule” applied in the employment context); Uniform Guidelines 
on Employment Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2014).  
50. See infra text accompanying notes 103–105. 
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gender, and national origin.51 Specific federal and state laws have further 
expanded these categories.52 While some laws prohibiting discrimination 
merely pertain to actions of the state (as opposed to the private parties 
engaged in the scoring dynamic here discussed), the protected group’s 
definition gives insights as to society take regarding this matter. The 
notion of what constitutes or should constitute a “protected group” is 
constantly in flux, yet it generally pertains to insular minority groups 
that in most cases suffered from past subordination. The discussion here 
will focus on the most salient form of such discrimination—one that is 
premised on the individual’s race. 
Professors Citron and Pasquale argue that the scored society increases 
the risks of discrimination towards protected groups and minorities. Yet 
examining this argument calls for the further parceling of this subset of 
discrimination. Discrimination against protected groups could result 
from explicit or implicit actions. In addition, it might result from neither, 
but the outcome of applying the scoring mechanism might generate a 
disparate impact against protected groups. An important element for 
distinguishing between various forms of discrimination is, therefore, the 
notion of intent. Forbidding intentional discrimination is easy to 
theoretically justify. But the unintentional discriminatory consequences 
of profit-seeking yet prejudice-free business-related conduct call for 
additional thought. In the next subsections, the Article will briefly 
examine the relevance of every one of the latter two concerns (implicit 
discrimination and disparate impact) to the issue at hand.53 
Explicit Discrimination: Explicit discrimination here refers to the 
unacceptable instances in which the score formulated explicitly includes, 
51. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 756 (drawing out the five classifications the Supreme Court has 
formally accorded heightened scrutiny: “race, national origin, alienage, sex, and nonmarital 
parentage”). Yoshino argues there will be no more classes accepted by law. Id. at 757 (“this canon 
has closed”). 
52. Id. at 757 n.73 (explaining that some states, such as California, have added “sexual 
orientation” as a protected class). In addition, age and disability have been recognized as classes 
worthy of protection under U.S. federal laws. For a discussion as to the groups recognized in the 
U.S. and other countries, see SANDRA FREDMAN, EUROPEAN COMM’N, EUROPEAN COMM’N 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR JUSTICE, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AND 
EQUALITY LAWS OF THE US, CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA AND INDIA 25 (2012), available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/comparative_study_ad_equality_laws_of_us_canada
_sa_india_en.pdf. 
53. Distinguishing between these notions of discrimination when structuring an analytical 
framework is a common analytical move among scholars discussing discrimination. For instance, 
Richard Ford explains that “[w]e have three distinct but related theories of discrimination: formal 
discrimination, discriminatory intent, and discriminatory effects,” thus mapping out a similar 
framework to the one noted in the text. RICHARD FORD, THE RACE CARD 183 (2008) (emphasis in 
original). 
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as a factor, an indication as to whether the individual belongs to a 
protected group (or, in the key example used thus far, the individual’s 
race). For such an outcome to unfold, the creation of the score was 
preceded by a process which featured the collection and subsequent 
analysis of information regarding the specific individual’s race.54 
Because current legal, social, and ethical rules as well as market 
sentiments will more than frown upon scoring which is explicitly based 
on race, such discrimination will most likely not transpire.55 A 
complicated subset of this form of discrimination, which indeed might 
unfold, is the use of race and other protected factors in scoring to 
promote affirmative action. This issue will be set aside for now.56 
Three analytical points strengthen the case for categorically banning 
such practices, yet nonetheless explain why this risk would probably fail 
to materialize in the scored society. I start with justification. The 
justifications for prohibiting these forms of discrimination can be 
articulated on several levels, which are both deontological and 
consequential. In other words, they both focus on the processor’s intent 
or on the process’ outcome. 
The intent to discriminate is unacceptable, in that when engaging in 
these forms of scoring, firms act differently and adversely towards 
minorities because they are minorities. Such conduct undermines basic 
notions of fairness.57 In addition, explicit and intentional discrimination 
is usually intrinsically immoral, as it features one individual incorrectly 
judging another to be of lesser moral worth.58 Yet explicit discrimination 
generates an additional specific harm given the actual and intentional use 
of membership of a protected class in the analysis process.59 Referring to 
54. For a discussion advocating some exceptions for using these factors when the consequences 
of neglecting them would prove “catastrophic” and their use will substantially increase the process’s 
effectiveness, see SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 186. This argument mostly pertains to the realm of 
national security and thus will be set aside in the context of this Article.  
55. See FORD, supra note 53, at 180 (“Today, facial discrimination is rare. Because the law flatly 
forbids it with very few exceptions and because it is conspicuous when it happens, few people pass 
facially discriminatory laws or adopt facially discriminatory policies.”). 
56. For more on this issue, see generally Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010); FORD, supra note 53, at 245–63.  
57. See SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 203–04 (discussing the basic Aristotelian concept of equality 
which is a measure of fairness).  
58. Alexander, supra note 38, at 159.  
59. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 13, at 25. For a discussion on the degrading nature of racially 
discriminating laws and the importance to reduce this effect, see FORD, supra note 53, at 180–83 
(explaining the insult caused to minorities when learning that others perceive them as inferior); 
Alexander, supra note 38, at 192 (discussing the insult biases entail); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative 
Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 467 (1997). 
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this specific form of attribute in a scoring process has a degrading 
effect,60 regardless of the negative impact of the detrimental treatment 
and to the extent its usage is publicly known. Interestingly, this final 
rationale might be somewhat weaker in the scoring contexts here 
discussed, given its automated nature. 
The outcomes of explicit discrimination often lead to unfair 
distributions of wealth and resources. In many cases, structuring scoring 
systems to discriminate on the basis of immutable traits such as race 
amounts to subordinating these minority groups. In some instances such 
discrimination contributes to their seclusion. One can argue that 
minorities must not receive negative treatment in view of wrongs 
inflicted upon them in the past and the persistence of negative 
stereotypes about them in the present.61 Yet given the importance of 
maintaining the firms’ ability to freely exercise preferences, the 
justifications which rely on mere outcome are somewhat weaker, they  
will be the focus of the “disparate impact” discussion below. 
A second point concerns the actual form of intention such 
discrimination involves. Explicit discrimination need not require the 
presence of bigotry.62 Indeed, a firm might apply such a racial factor in 
its analysis while merely striving to achieve various economic 
objectives, such as exploiting a minority group’s disadvantages, or 
catering to the (at times, implicit) prejudice of its customers.63 Even in 
the absence of explicit bigotry, such other forms of intent are more than 
enough to justify a categorical ban on these practices because most of 
the deontological and consequential justifications noted above apply. 
To further strengthen the argument for categorically banning this 
form of scoring, it is worth emphasizing that scoring practices based on 
racial characteristics must be considered forms of intentional 
discrimination even when the scoring method is formulated 
automatically. Consider a scenario in which a multitude of data input 
points—including those pertaining to race or other protected 
parameters—are collected in the field and aggregated into one dataset. 
Thereafter, data mining is used automatically to identify factors that 
60. One might note a possible caveat that this harm is reduced in the situation at hand, given its 
secretive nature. Yet this response is unacceptable. Not only might information regarding such 
conduct leak, the fact that those carrying out the scheme know of it generates substantial harm.  
61. For an additional discussion of these elements, see infra notes 108–121 and accompanying 
text.  
62. This form of discrimination is referred to as “first generation discrimination.” See Sturm, 
supra note 15, at 461. 
63. See Ayres, supra note 46, at 843–45. Note that in some of these cases, minorities have chosen 
to discriminate against minorities as well for such reasons.  
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correlate with risk-predicting behaviors. Finally, such factors are 
grouped together to formulate a score.64 Those applying the score might 
not have intended to use race in this process and thus argue that this was 
merely the result of the automated process which “chose” this factor out 
of hundreds of options. Yet these practices nonetheless feature intent, 
even though its manifestation is somewhat unconventional. The 
indications of intent in this setting could be derived from either the 
inclusion of race in the initial set of analyzed factors or the practice of 
applying a scoring mechanism which relies on race, even among many 
other elements. The firm should not be able to hide behind the automatic 
nature of the process, and must actively examine the factors it applies in 
the scoring process before it is launched.65 
Even though the nature of intent in automated process is different, 
most of the justifications for banning intentional discrimination apply. 
The firms’ actions intentionally single out minorities, treat them 
differently and thus act unfairly. In addition, the scoring process will 
also prove degrading towards minorities as it would be understood to 
generate an intentional discriminatory process. However, the scoring 
entities might not be making a moral judgment which is intrinsically 
unjust, as they might not be actively finding another group of humans to 
be of lesser worth when relying on the automated output. 
Third, battling this form of explicit discrimination will not prove to be 
simple, but is ultimately achievable. While setting forth rules which ban 
such practices might be relatively easy, enforcing such a ban in a world 
in which the nature of the algorithm used is secret might prove to be a 
challenge. However, many of the solutions set forth by Professors Citron 
and Pasquale will be helpful in revealing such practices, thus leading to 
their termination.66 For instance, various forms of auditing and licensing 
will contribute to revealing explicitly discriminatory scoring.67 
Furthermore, I suspect that the usage of race in the scoring process will 
most likely leak to the authorities or to the press. Therefore, firms will 
be reluctant to make use of such factors explicitly to begin with. They 
might, intentionally or not, opt for implicit forms of discrimination, 
which the Article now addresses. 
64. For a full description of this process, see Zarsky, supra note 5, at 9–15. 
65. This, in fact, will require the scoring process to be deemed interpretable—understandable at 
least to the firm’s own analysts. For a broader explanation of the concept of interpretability and its 
implications, see Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1519 (2013). 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 17–22. 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 17–22.  
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B. Implicit Discrimination 
Even when scoring firms do not explicitly rely upon race or other 
factors related to protected groups, scoring methods can prove 
discriminatory. For example, this will occur when the scoring 
mechanism applies proxies for race as part of its protocol. Such a 
dynamic will feature the inclusion of factors which, when applied in 
concert, are correlated with race beyond a specific threshold (i.e. the 
proxy need not prove perfect to be considered problematic). There might 
also be other subtle ways to engage in this form of discrimination. As 
Professors Citron and Pasquale explain, biases can be “embedded into 
the software’s instructions.”68 The crucial point here is that when the 
final outcome of the scoring process would be adverse towards a 
minority or other protected group, hidden forms of intent might be in 
play. These are instances commonly referred to as implicit 
discrimination. 
Implicit discrimination (at times described as “second generation 
discrimination”69) might indeed prove intentional. Yet identifying such 
intent and applying the antidiscrimination justifications explained above 
is quite a challenge. Three common forms of implicit discrimination 
within the context of a scored society include masking, subconscious 
discriminatory motivations, and relying upon tainted datasets or tools. In 
what follows, this Article details the specific theoretical aspects of each 
form; examines the role intent70 might play; and provides a limited 
discussion as to possible actions which might be taken to mitigate this 
concern. 
Masking: The decision to engage in implicit discrimination might be a 
clear and calculated one. As Barocas and Selbst recently explain in their 
working paper titled Big Data’s Disparate Impact, discriminating firms 
might choose to “mask” their discriminatory practices in a way in which 
the discrimination might prove undetectable, or at least defensible.71 
These might be actions of firms which strive to introduce specific and 
organizational structures to assure that social status quo is maintained 
and minorities receive inferior treatment.72 These need not be the work 
68. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 4.  
69. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 768; Sturm, supra note 15, at 468; see also Kenj Yoshino, The 
New Equal Protection, CONST. IN 2020 (Dec. 1, 2004), http://constitutionin2020.blogspot.co.il/ 
2004/12/new-equal-protection-post-by-kenji.html. 
70. Note again that the following is a theoretical, not a doctrinal analysis. Legal doctrine has 
limited the meaning of “intent” in this context. See infra text accompanying note 84. 
71. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 13, at 21–23.  
72. Sturm, supra note 15, at 469 (“Exclusion increasingly results . . . as a byproduct of ongoing 
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of bigotry necessarily, but merely of calculated businesspeople striving 
to achieve their objectives. 
Nonetheless, the “masking” of such discrimination is unacceptable. 
Here, most of justifications against explicit discrimination are directly 
relevant. Such conduct undermines a basic notion of equality.73 
Individuals must not be treated differently based on their race or because 
of their race74 (or any other factor distinguishing protected groups). 
Moreover, if masking resulted from intentional discrimination against a 
specific group, it is intrinsically morally unacceptable.75 In addition, 
masking generates unjust outcomes (a limited argument when presented 
on its own). Masking, however, raises analytical questions as to the 
applicability of the antidiscrimination justification which strives to limit 
the insult to minorities. Here, one might argue that the “masking” 
counters the insult such practices convey. Yet such insult will indeed 
unfold should society suspect (and in the digital age, such suspicions 
will quickly circulate) that such masking has transpired. 
To effectively identify and hopefully eliminate these forms of 
discrimination, the disclosure measures Professors Citron and Pasquale 
propose appear adequate. For instance, studying the firm’s audit logs 
might allow for discovering such discrimination after the fact.76 
However, to initially start such an inquiry, the scoring systems must be 
tested and examined so to reveal whether minorities receive overall 
inferior treatment, and thereafter an investigation to try and uncover 
such masking might be launched. Indeed The Scored Society makes 
reference to such initial steps, while explaining that scoring systems 
“should be run through testing suites that run expected and unexpected 
hypothetical scenarios designed by policy experts. Testing . . . would 
help detect both programmers’ potential bias.”77 
Subconscious Bias and Implicit Discrimination: A second form of 
implicit discrimination might result from long learned biases against 
minorities and other protected groups. These biases subconsciously (or 
unconsciously) impact the actions of the analysts who structure the 
scoring systems, and the algorithms that recommend what parameters 
interactions shaped by the structures of day-to-day decision-making and workplace relationships.”). 
73. See Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Queues in Law, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1596, 1608–14 (2014) 
(explaining the analytical foundations of negative and positive equality and pointing to other 
relevant sources).  
74. For a discussion in the context of employment, see Sturm, supra note 15, at 473.  
75. See supra text accompanying note 58.  
76. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 28. 
77. Id. at 25. 
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should be used, and how they are used.78 Analysts might be prone to 
make decisions that evidentially disenfranchise minorities given their 
own prejudice.79 Subtle decisions may lead to an overall discriminatory 
outcome. A scoring process which is premised on the collection and 
analysis of vast databases of personal information offers a wealth of 
opportunities for subconsciously biased decisions to materialize.80 For 
instance, at some points, analysts must decide which correlations and 
patterns should be incorporated into the scoring model and which must 
be set aside as “junk,” random results, or statistical errors. Here, the 
analyst’s biases might shape the final outcome and the discriminatory 
effect it will involve. 
Subconscious discrimination is yet another form of implicit 
discrimination which society must find unacceptable.81 The fact that 
actual “intention” in its customary form is absent indeed undermines 
some of the basic justifications for applying antidiscrimination 
measures. It is difficult to find discrimination undertaken subconsciously 
on par with conscious discrimination which expresses a lack of moral 
respect and clearly generates insult.82 Nonetheless, implicit 
discrimination still generates an outcome which singles out minorities 
because they are minorities, and is therefore unjust. Prohibiting this form 
of discrimination could also be merely justified based on the imbalanced 
78. See Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 484–85 (2010) (noting studies that indicate implicit racial bias and 
discrimination in employment); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1138 
(1999) (discussing the role unconscious bias plays in various contexts and how it might amount to 
disparate treatment). But see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the 
Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1108–10 (2006) (calling for caution when applying 
the findings indicating biases in the lab to actual policy decisions which pertain to and impact actual 
interactions in the field). 
79. For a famous discussion of such bias against married couples in a somewhat different context, 
see Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, in HUMAN VALUES AND THE 
DESIGN OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 21, 30 (Batya Friedman ed., 1997) (one can further speculate 
that given the preference the system gave to the choices of the couple’s predefined “leading 
member” this bias actually adversely impacted women). 
80. Zarsky, supra note 65, at 1518–19; see also Steve Lohr, For Big-Data Scientists, ‘Janitor 
Work’ Is Key Hurdle to Insights, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014, 4:55 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/08/18/technology/for-big-data-scientists-hurdle-to-insights-is-janitor-work.html (explaining 
that the analysis of big data first requires a great deal of manual work—fifty to eighty percent of the 
overall time of analysis—collecting and preparing data for the subsequent process. These often 
ignored preparatory steps allow for a variety of instances in which the biases discussed could impact 
the scoring process.). 
81. See Alexander, supra note 38, at 179–83, for an interesting discussion as to when this form of 
discrimination should be considered a conscious one.  
82. See id. at 181.  
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outcomes which will follow. Yet, as noted,83 the merit of such 
justifications is limited. 
However, battling these forms of discrimination might require 
somewhat different responses than those noted above. As with other 
forms of subconscious discrimination, education might prove helpful.84 
In addition, assuring a higher level of automation and adherence to the 
statistical protocols (and a lower level of human discretion which fuels 
such implicit discrimination) is, somewhat counter-intuitively,85 called 
for. Yet above all, novel methods of auditing and supervision of the 
analysts’ actions must be developed to limit such discrimination. 
Reliance on Tainted Datasets and Tools: In a third set of cases, those 
structuring the scoring mechanism might generate a discriminatory 
outcome by recklessly86—or perhaps, merely negligently—relying upon 
tainted datasets.87 The analysis might rest upon existing datasets or data 
collection methods which systematically discriminate (or discriminated 
in the past) against minorities. For instance, the dataset pertaining to 
employees’ previous achievements (upon which the analysis was later 
premised) might be tilted against minorities given their lack of past 
success because of a harsh work environment resulting from 
discriminatory attitudes, or the lack of minority hiring altogether.88 In 
other instances, negative information regarding minorities might be 
overrepresented in the relevant database. This might result from an 
oversampling bias; given existing prejudice, minorities are sampled 
more often for indiscretions, and thus their indiscretions are over-
represented in the database which is subsequently used for formulating 
83. See supra text accompanying note 60.  
84. Kang & Lane, supra note 78, at 500 (demonstrating how de-biasing could be achieved via 
juror education to battle bias in the courtroom). 
85. This measure is counter-intuitive, as one would assume that enhanced automation would 
generate a greater, rather than a lesser, amount of this form of discrimination. Automation is often 
considered to invoke inherent opacity, which in turn will allow for various forms of implicit 
discrimination such as “masking” to unfold.  
86. For an analysis of the standard for “recklessness” in the context of discrimination in 
employment, see generally Joseph A. Seiner, Punitive Damages, Due Process, and Employment 
Discrimination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 473 (2012). 
87. A possible difficulty might arise in establishing whether those relying on the datasets are 
indeed reckless, or merely negligent. Applying the “reckless” paradigm to this juncture allows for 
easily including this discussion within the broader topic of intentional discrimination. For a 
discussion of discrimination via negligence in a somewhat different context, see David Benjamin 
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993) (focusing on workplace 
discrimination).  
88. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 13, at 13. For a different form of misrepresentations of 
minorities, see Kate Crawford, The Hidden Biases in Big Data, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG NETWORK 
(April 1, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data/.  
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the scoring scheme.89 Even though some of these errors will be resolved 
over time as samples are renewed, others will persist. The likely 
outcome of an analysis (be it manual or automated) that relies upon a 
database ridden with discriminatory data would itself be a discriminatory 
score and a process which systematically disfavors minorities. 
This form of discrimination does not involve the explicit 
discriminatory intent of those who structure the scoring schemes.90 Yet 
the recklessness (or negligence) of relying on a tainted dataset leads to 
similar discrimination via scoring. Therefore, such behavior should be 
actively countered. The justifications for applying anti-discriminatory 
measures at this juncture are similar (and limited) to those offered to 
justify actions to counter subconscious discrimination. Here again, 
minorities and other protected groups are subjected to negative 
outcomes, and are treated negatively because of bias and prejudice—
actions which society deems unfair. Indeed, such biases and prejudice 
are reflected in the explicit, implicit, or even subconscious actions of 
others91—those either creating the dataset, or engaging in various 
actions which caused the dataset evidently used to be racially 
imbalanced and tainted. Yet the analysts constructing the scoring 
systems cannot escape responsibility. By relying on tainted datasets they 
directly contribute to the discriminatory conduct. Analysts and 
executives must proactively assure that the datasets used are not tainted 
prior to launching schemes based upon them, as these datasets will 
adversely impact minorities. 
The firms’ failure to act92 and prevent discrimination is, therefore, the 
analytical hook which incorporates intent into this scenario and provides 
justification for intervening in the discriminating firms’ actions. 
Additional policy discussions must establish the proper standard of care 
this normative justification calls for on behalf of the scorers. As well, it 
must be established whether merely recklessness or perhaps negligence 
might render scorers’ actions immoral. However, once the scoring entity 
is put on notice as to possible problems in the dataset, much of this 
discussion should be rendered irrelevant. The firms relying on a dataset 
89. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT , AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND 
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 29–30 (2007).  
90. Current law only sees “intent” as conscious choices. See Linda H. Krieger, The Content of 
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1231 (1995). 
91. Analyzing the normative shortcomings of those whose actions contributed to the creation of 
the tainted dataset calls for a distinct discussion which is unnecessary at this juncture.  
92. For a discussion of duties to act in a broad variety of settings related to discrimination law, 
see Oppenheimer, supra note 87, at 936.  
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known to be tainted are reckless and their actions are morally 
unacceptable. Thus, the importance of disclosing the inner workings of 
the scoring process—at least to a group of experts—is apparent. Such 
disclosures93 assure that the scoring entity will no longer be able to 
claim it inadvertently relied upon tainted data (as third parties examining 
the process will call this fact to its attention). However, discriminatory 
outcomes which persist even after the scoring entity meets acceptable 
standards of caution must be addressed under the discussion of 
“disparate impact” in Part III below. 
Turning to possible solutions for the “tainted dataset” problem leads 
to several challenging dynamics. Beyond transparency, discrimination 
which results from tainted datasets might be resolved by insisting that 
analysts take sufficient steps to scrub existing processes and datasets of 
previous biases prior to incorporating them into the scoring process (thus 
“de-biasing” them). Recent scholarship in computer science has set forth 
various suggestions as to how this might be both achieved and audited.94 
Auditing whether dataset de-biasing processes were properly carried out 
does not require the exposure of the proprietary scoring method, i.e. the 
factors used in setting the score and the balance among them. Scoring 
firms often resist such disclosure while claiming that it undermines trade 
secrets and enables gaming of the system.95 The disclosure discussed 
here merely involves examining the databases used in the process. Thus, 
objections to allowing governmental or other external watchdogs to 
engage in such queries are less persuasive. However, this de-biasing 
process might be unachievable and calls for greater thought. 
Blatant Proxies: Before concluding, let us consider a specific 
situation which does not neatly fit within the discussion of explicit or 
implicit discrimination. In this case, merely one of the factors used in the 
scoring process (and of course the process of analysis could apply 
hundreds of factors) is a suspicious factor which could only be 
understood as a proxy for a protected group. Antidiscrimination law has 
an extensive history of dealing with factors suspected to be mere “stand-
ins” for protected groups, such as zip codes as proxies for race (i.e. 
93. It is possible that the disclosure need not include the actual datasets but merely indicate the 
data sources used. Thereafter, experts can inform the scoring entity that such sources are historically 
tainted.  
94. See Andrea Romei & Salvatore Ruggieri, A Multidisciplinary Survey on Discrimination 
Analysis, KNOWLEDGE ENG’G REV., 2013, at 39–40; infra text accompanying notes 126–127. 
95. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 5, 17 (noting certain credit companies have refused to 
divulge their algorithms on the basis of trade secret protections); id. at 26, 30 (discounting concerns 
that divulging the logic of predictive algorithms would result in individuals gaming those systems).  
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redlining),96 and height and weight as proxies for gender.97 The age of 
Big Data might bring with it a new wave of blatant proxies. These 
proxies will now be available to the data analysts, which could easily 
produce a variety of accurate predictors of membership in a protected 
group. For example, consider an insurer or retailer using the consistent 
consumption of Hallal meat (an indication of adherence to the rules of 
Islam) or the systematic avoidance of shopping during Jewish holidays 
(an indication of the consumer being an orthodox Jew) as one of the 
many factors applied in its pricing or marketing schemes. These are 
merely simple examples of precise proxies for religion which could be 
inserted into a scoring mechanism. 
I argue that the use of such factors is socially unacceptable, and that 
these factors must be removed from the scoring algorithm when highly 
correlated with a protected group.98 As opposed to the last two forms of 
discrimination (the existence of subconscious bias and the use of tainted 
datasets), the normative emphasis here should be on the insult such 
discrimination generates. Pointing to minorities, even via proxies, must 
not be allowed because the precise nature of the proxy is largely capable 
of generating an insulting impact on par with that of explicit 
discrimination.99 With such a blatant proxy, it need not matter what the 
internal motivations for applying these factors prove to be (thus 
distinguishing this category from that of “masking”). It also need not 
matter whether applying such proxies has any form of effect (as opposed 
to “disparate impact” discussed below). The analytical hook for finding 
such actions morally unacceptable is again that of the firms’ reckless or 
negligent conduct—this time while applying proxies—are highly 
correlated with race. 
Those regulating scoring processes must take steps—within reason—
to actively block the usage of blatant proxies. Scoring entities should 
apply auditing methods to reveal these practices, even at the cost of 
efficiency. Such steps should examine correlations between the factors 
selected in the scoring practice and those factors which implicated 
minorities (which must be made available through other data sources) in 
an effort to detect such blatant proxies. Given the fear that exposing the 
96. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 13, at 19.  
97. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323–24 (1977). 
98. Additional policy work is required to set parameters as to how to distinguish between an 
unacceptably structured blatant proxy, and a simple and less accurate one that would be allowed.  
99. Adverse outcomes towards minorities might follow as well, yet this section focuses on harms 
related to intent. The extent to which outcome-based concerns are sufficient to generate a regulatory 
response is discussed infra, Part II.C.  
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nature of the scoring process might reveal the firms’ trade secrets, such 
auditing might be carried out either internally, or through an automated 
process carried out by a certifying authority. 
To summarize, reliance upon scoring might lead to implicit 
discrimination against protected groups. Recognizing the methods of 
discrimination allows for sharpening the normative justifications and 
setting forth policy recommendations which call for various forms of 
disclosure, as well as other specific regulatory responses. I concede that 
this discussion expands the notion of intent and includes within it a vast 
set of behaviors. Such an expansion was crucial to analytically consider 
the discriminatory actions in view of a broader set of justifications, 
which do not merely involve the unacceptable effects of the 
discriminatory outcome. 
Yet even such an expansive definition of intent cannot include all 
instances in which scoring methods lead to discrimination. For example, 
discrimination might occur when non-blatant proxies for race are 
applied. Or the datasets used might not be tainted to the extent that 
relying on them is reckless (or negligent). To capture the cases which 
cannot be categorized as implicit (or explicit) discrimination, I now 
introduce and address the concept of disparate impact. 
C. Disparate Impact 
Beyond the forms of discrimination discussed thus far, there might be 
yet another set of scenarios which The Scored Society brings about; one 
that merely features disparate impact. To explain, consider the following 
example. Here, an audit of the scoring mechanism indicates that a 
specific racial minority or other protected groups received adverse 
treatment. Those administrating the scoring system are baffled and upset 
by the audit’s conclusion. They launch an extensive inquiry to 
understand why this outcome unfolded. The investigation revealed no 
smoking guns. An investigator reasonably examining the auditing logs 
found no intention to engage in masking. The initial actions of the 
scoring analysts were all within reason and with no hint of subconscious 
bias. The datasets used were all reasonably updated and even properly 
corrected to assure they do not account for past mistreatments. Yet 
nonetheless the scoring system is biased towards minorities;100 the 
scoring process that emerged—as a whole—proved to be a proxy for 
100. This description is not entirely hypothetical, but reflects recent lawsuits against various 
entities such as lenders and insurance companies. For one example of such a lawsuit, see Citron & 
Pasquale, supra note 1, at 15. 
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race. 
This example leads to a crucial question—must scoring mechanisms 
which produce a disparate impact, yet contain no trace of prejudice or 
intent, be banned?101 If so, what normative theory upholds this 
conclusion? Before proceeding, a quick doctrinal note is called for. In 
the United States, current law only forbids disparate impact in specific 
instances, such as employment.102 However, even in many of these 
cases, practices which generate a disparate impact on minorities can still 
be justified when a “business necessity” for such conduct exists.103 The 
definition of the term “business necessity” is murky and somewhat 
unclear.104 In addition, the Supreme Court does not recognize 
discrimination via disparate impact alone as countering the constitutional 
protection provided by the Equal Protection Clause.105 Nonetheless, 
examining disparate impact in this novel context is an important task 
given scoring’s unique attributes. 
Disparate Impact as Disparate Treatment in Disguise: One reason to 
prohibit disparate impact is that it provides a clear indication of one of 
the various implicit or explicit forms of discrimination—discrimination 
practices to which responses could be justified, as noted above. In other 
words, the rationale for prohibiting disparate impact lies in the 
implausibility of the fact pattern noted above: discriminatory intent 
(broadly defined) was not found because those looking for it have not 
looked hard enough. Or, those engaging in discrimination were very 
successful in masking their actions. Alternatively, the datasets used were 
not sufficiently examined to remove tainted data (although the firm 
might argue that they were). Disparate impact should therefore be 
considered as smoke indicating the fire of intentional discrimination.106 
101. In many instances, these issues are not resolved by courts, but settled outside of them. See, 
e.g., Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, at 
B3. 
102. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); see generally Primus, supra note 56, for a discussion of the 
proper way to understand disparate impact provisions in view of a recent Supreme Court precedent; 
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 
515 (2003) (drawing out the legislative motives behind disparate impact doctrine). 
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
104. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 13, at 32 (“[T]he definitions of . . . business necessity have 
never been clear . . . .”).  
105. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to 
Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 
42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1154 n.65 (2007).  Note, however, that other countries have 
broader recognition and protection for disparate impact. See Fredman, supra note 52, at 50–55. 
106. See Primus, supra note 56, at 1376 (referring to this rationale as an “evidentiary dragnet”). 
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It must be treated just as explicit or implicit discrimination, with all the 
theoretical justifications that follow for prohibiting those types of 
discrimination. Even if a few specific cases of disparate impact do not 
actually involve intentional discrimination, yet are nonetheless 
considered as such, an over-inclusive legal rule regarding disparate 
impact is still an acceptable social compromise. It is merely a small and 
fair price to be paid (most likely by the powerful majority) in the overall 
battle against racial discrimination (or the discrimination of other 
“protected groups”).107 
Those who suspect the existence of implicit discrimination, even 
when it cannot be found, often have good reasons to do so. The 
argument that intentional discrimination is afoot when disparate impact 
exists is particularly strong in contexts where specific groups have been 
harshly discriminated against in the past. However, additional studies of 
this matter might indicate that some forms of intentional discrimination 
have been set aside, especially if carried out in the automated 
environment of the scored society. Therefore, it is important to further 
examine theories which find disparate impact to be normatively 
unacceptable, irrespective of intent. 
A Normative Theory of Disparate Impact: Broadly speaking, the 
justifications for barring disparate impact could be summarized under 
two (somewhat overlapping) themes.108 Naturally, these are 
consequential arguments which focus on the severe outcomes of 
disparate impact towards a minority group. They explain why society 
must not permit such outcomes to unfold, given the substantial harm 
they will unequally inflict on one social segment. Such severe harm 
justifies placing legal requirements on private entities which are 
seemingly exercising their legitimate preferences. 
One such justification is derived from the harm of social segregation. 
Providing inferior treatment to minorities removes them from society as 
He also sees this rationale as weak, noting that the rule does not include a “good faith” exception. 
Id. 
107. Alexander and Cole make a similar point regarding the logic of applying an overall ban on 
discrimination—be it rational or irrational, see Larry Alexander & Kevin Cole, Discrimination by 
Proxy, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 453, 456 (1997) (“[W]e would be . . . wise to pay the cost of 
forbidding some rational racial discrimination in order to ensnare nonrational and irrational racial 
discrimination that might otherwise sneak through masquerading as rational discrimination.”).  
108. Prominent antidiscrimination scholars have noted the difficulty with unwrapping the 
theoretical components of disparate impact. Richard Ford, for example, has noted that the theory of 
disparate impact remains “the most controversial doctrine in contemporary civil rights.” FORD, 
supra note 53, at 217.  
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a whole and segregates them.109 In some instances, disparate impact 
might even lead to social subordination110—a situation in which a 
specific group is treated poorly as a whole. These dynamics have 
extensive and long lasting repercussions. Systematically discriminating 
against one group removes its members from positions of power and 
wealth in society,111 causing them to remain internally segregated.112 
With time, this social conduct might generate additional negative 
dynamics impacting the segregated group, such as social disengagement, 
distrust, higher crime rates, and, at the end of the day, greater inequality 
between the minority and majority groups. These are all outcomes which 
society must try and avoid. 
Another related theory finding disparate impact problematic is that of 
stigmatization.113 A social system which generates a disparate impact by 
providing minorities with inferior treatment either creates or most likely 
contributes to a negative stigma already attached to these minority 
groups. For instance, when a scoring system indicates that, on a whole, 
members of a protected group are less creditworthy in a specific setting, 
this indication sends a message, which contributes to a historical 
prejudice that all members of this group are not trustworthy in many 
other contexts. Such stigma impacts the way the group is viewed by 
others, as well as how the group members view themselves.114 
Stigmatization leads to the lowering of aspirations, energy, and 
productivity within the group.115 It might also lead to adverse treatment 
of this group in other contexts by others. In many instances, 
“stigmatization” and “segregation” are closely linked. The isolation of a 
specific group feeds the negative stigma about it, and vice versa. 
109. Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 189 (explaining how the inclusion of race or ethnicity in an 
algorithm may produce racial or ethnic separation, and that this might be undesirable morally and 
socially); see also Primus, supra note 56, at 1376 (explaining that one of the justifications for 
prohibiting disparate impact is to “redress self-perpetuating racial hierarchies inherited from the 
past”). 
110. Cf. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 13, at 54 (noting anti-subordination theory as a principle 
that “undergirded anti-discrimination law”). 
111. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 18. 
112. These are dynamics that reinforce themselves, possibly replicating a “caste system.” J.M. 
Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2353 (1997). 
113. See Citron & Pasqual, supra note 1, at 7; cf. SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 189.  
114. See generally Alexander & Cole, supra note 107, at 457 (“Members of groups discriminated 
against might suffer psychically even if not personally affected by the law.”). Note the difference 
between this argument and the one pertaining to the insult derived from intentional discrimination. 
Here, the stigma attaches as a result of the discriminatory outcome, regardless of the perceived or 
actual intent of those carrying out the scoring process.  
115. Alexander, supra note 38, at 162.  
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Fleshing out the theories behind an overall prohibition of disparate 
impact allows for identifying the limits of such theories, when applied to 
scoring. The theory of segregation is indeed relevant in the contexts at 
the focus of Professors Citron and Pasquale’s work—those of credit and 
employment. Here, lower rankings and scores applied to a specific group 
quickly translate into transfers of wealth and changes in social stature.116 
It is therefore no surprise that in these specific contexts the United States 
Congress stepped in to prohibit private parties from engaging in 
discrimination—even in the form of disparate impact alone—against 
protected groups.117 However, one might ask whether this rationale 
equally holds for other instances in which scoring is or will be applied to 
such groups, such as in advertising, marketing, and perhaps insurance. 
The wealth of social groups that receive different or even inferior offers 
for the purchase of goods will likely only be marginally impacted and 
this process will probably not lead to the groups’ segregation.  
Therefore, prohibiting disparate impact in advertising and marketing 
practices cannot be justified on the basis of the “segregation” theory. I 
further note, cautiously, that scoring practices applied in most forms of 
insurance will probably not generate the signs of segregation or its 
effects as well. If an individual is unable to obtain insurance due to high 
rates, this lack of insurance is surely detrimental for that individual, 
especially if the uninsured risk materializes. And the disparate impact of 
higher rates of insurance might encumber an entire group. Yet stating 
that higher rates will generate a segregating effect is somewhat of a 
stretch, when compared to the very real segregation that lack of access to 
certain types of employment and credit will create. 
On the other hand, considering the effects of “stigmatization” that 
may occur through the disparate impact of a scoring process may lead to 
a different conclusion. Indeed, this second justification might provide 
greater credence to the prohibition of disparate impact in other scenarios. 
Here, the key to an extensive adverse impact on a specific segment of 
society is how visible and salient the process is in the eyes of those 
discriminated against, as well as to other segments of the public. 
Advertising and marketing, for instance, are highly salient by nature and 
the messages they produce reach a broad segment of the public. A 
stigmatizing message delivered in such contexts will have a wide-
116. Cf. Lea Shepard, Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 1695, 1765 (2012) (noting the effect of low credit scores on racial equality and social 
mobility). 
117. For protection with respect to creditors, see id. at 1729. With respect to employment, see 
Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). 
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ranging impact. Therefore, the potential for stigmatization should raise 
concern, even if no discriminatory intent is found.118 The same could 
probably be said of insurance. Here, a discriminating scoring scheme 
forcefully signals to the public that a specific group generates greater 
risks—a message which could be easily misinterpreted and applied 
wrongfully to a variety of other contexts. The scientific aura of the 
scoring process will most likely further exacerbate the stigma-based 
concerns.119 
A possible caveat, limiting the strength of the “stigma” argument in 
the context of scoring, pertains to the process’s limited visibility.120 The 
internal workings of the scoring process are notoriously opaque. Given 
the process’s complexity, it is very difficult for an external observer to 
establish trends derived from its implementation, beyond some anecdotal 
observations. Therefore, one must question whether the outcome of this 
process might generate a substantial change in the way a group 
experiences stigma.121 
In view of this latter critique, prohibiting disparate impact merely on 
the basis of the stigma rationale (in situations in which the segregation-
based rationale is unconvincing) calls for a nuanced approach. If the 
protected group already suffers from a negative social stigma and the 
stigmatizing message derived from the scoring scheme is highly 
negative also, action against disparate impact is justified. In other 
instances, more lenient steps such as greater emphasis on education 
regarding the destructive nature of stereotypes, the proper understanding 
of statistics, and the importance of tolerance might suffice.122 In 
addition, stigma-based concerns call into question the wisdom of 
exposing the inner workings of the scoring process to the broad 
public.123 Perhaps some of the more subtle forms of disclosure discussed 
in The Scored Society (such as interactive modeling) might prove a 
118. For an example of such a setting, see Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad 
Delivery, 56(5) COMM. OF THE ACM 44 (2013), available at http://privacytools.seas.harvard.edu/ 
files/privacytools/files/p44-sweeney.pdf. 
119. See Zarsky, supra note 80, at 1562 (presenting a similar argument).  
120. Alexander and Cole, supra note 107, at 457, make a similar argument regarding covert users 
of classifications. 
121. James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE. L.J. 1719, 1736 (2005) 
(explaining that when dealing with software on a case-by-case basis, it might be very difficult for 
those interacting with it to recognize the existence of systematic discrimination).  
122. On the importance of explaining the proper meaning of statistical inferences and how they 
could be misunderstood in the age of data mining and data analysis, see Zarsky, supra note 65, at 
1565. 
123. For a similar argument, see id. at 1567. 
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better fit.124 In such cases, individuals can gain insights to the scoring 
process without aggravating existing stereotypes. 
Beyond the disclosure measures noted above,125 two additional steps 
might be considered to mitigate disparate impact in scoring. First, the 
scoring factors which contribute to the creation of a disparate impact 
(i.e. disproportionately indicating minorities) could be removed from the 
overall score applied or the databases used. Second, the factors within 
the datasets used or the scores applied could be recalibrated in a way 
which will limit the disparate impact resulting from analyzing and using 
them.126 Properly understanding both of these steps requires a discussion 
which goes beyond this Article. Yet such a discussion is nonetheless 
crucial, as computer science literature has already begun addressing 
these options.127 Legal scholarship must move to introduce its 
perspective regarding these matters.128 Indeed, both technical steps raise 
difficult questions. The first step might render the entire scoring process 
unusable, as over time all the relevant factors are removed from it, thus 
diminishing its predictive power. The second step might be considered 
as an illegal form of racial or other discrimination,129 this time 
discriminating against the majority groups who find the scoring 
mechanisms deliberately tilted in their disfavor.130 
I conclude with two important insights. First, I provide a quick 
reference to the “wrongs of the past” justification to prohibit 
124. See supra text accompanying notes 21–22.  
125. See supra text accompanying notes 19–23.  
126. See Romei & Ruggieri, supra note 94, at 39–40.  
127. In their bibliographical review of these issues, Andrea Romei and Salvatore Ruggieri sum up 
the current strategies examined in the computer science realm as follows (while referring to a 
variety of sources noting these studies): “We categorize three non mutually-exclusive strategies 
toward discrimination prevention: (i) a controlled distortion of the training set (a pre-processing 
approach); (ii) a modification of the classification learning algorithm (an in-processing approach), 
by integrating anti-discrimination criteria within it; (iii) a post-processing of the classification 
model, once it has been extracted, to correct its decision criteria.” Andrea Romei & Salvatore 
Ruggieri, Discrimination Data Analysis: A Multi-disciplinary Bibliography, in DISCRIMINATION 
AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: DATA MINING AND PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES 
109, 122 (Bart Custers et al. eds., 2013) (citations omitted).  
128. The first steps of doing so are carried out by Barocas and Selbst, supra note 13, at 51.  
129. For instance, it is possible that such actions must be carried out by courts, but not private 
entities on their own. See Primus, supra note 56, at 1369. Another factor in the legality of these 
processes is whether there is a visible victim of discrimination when recalibrating these parameters. 
See id. at 1369. It is indeed possible that when tinkering with the scoring mechanisms no such 
visible victim exists, and therefore such actions are permissible.  
130. See id. at 1362 (explaining how a recent Supreme Court decision might be understood to 
state that “any operation of the disparate impact standard is an equal protection problem,” thus 
meaning that it constitutes discrimination against the majority group). 
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discrimination. A possible reason to prohibit scoring that generates 
disparate impact is the fact that it is unacceptable to adversely treat a 
specific minority group in view of wrongs inflicted against that group in 
the past.131 This justification applies even if no stigma will attach or 
segregation will occur. Yet this theory raises serious questions and might 
have only limited implications.132 It should indeed prove relevant when 
the implications of disparate impact are dire, and the previous wrongs 
are the reasons for the predictive correlations which indicate minorities 
as higher risks (for instance, wrongs of the past led to the group’s 
disenfranchisement and thus current poor track record in employment 
and credit). In such cases, adverse disparate impact should be prohibited 
and the allocation mechanisms must be recalibrated to avoid this 
outcome. The stronger groups within society must all contribute to the 
minority group’s quick compensation and rebuilding.133 Yet fully 
developing this argument calls for a separate analysis. 
Second, I note the importance of gathering sensitive data in the scored 
society. A recurring element throughout this discussion of discrimination 
is the need to examine and test whether disparate impact is occurring. 
Understanding the scope of disparate impact is essential either to battle it 
as a phenomenon directly or to recognize it as an indication of a form of 
implicit, yet intentional discrimination. However, discovering such 
forms of discrimination calls for comparing the way scoring systems 
treat various forms of groups (for instance minorities as opposed to other 
social segments), while using sensitive factors (i.e. race) as part of the 
comparison. To conduct such analysis, the auditing entity—be it the 
government, the scoring firm, or a third party—must obtain a dataset 
which includes a vast amount of personal and identifiable information 
regarding individuals, including sensitive information about them (i.e. 
their race, religion, etc).134 
131. In the context of gender and race, see SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 153 n.28. This argument 
is rejected by Alexander in a similar context. See Alexander, supra note 38, at 187–89 (noting that 
past wrongdoings do not “appear to bear on the morality of acting on present ordinary preferences,” 
beyond the notion that those subjected to past wrongs should receive reparations). But see Primus, 
supra note 102, at 523–32 (noting “integrating the workplace” as a possible justification for the 
disparate impact rules under Title VII). 
132. See Alexander, supra note 38, at 189. 
133. For a discussion of this issue, see SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 153. 
134. Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy and It’s Not Fair, 66 STAN L. REV. 
ONLINE 35, 37 (2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/ 
DworkMullliganSLR.pdf (“Protecting against this sort of discriminatory impact is advanced by data 
about legally protected statuses, since the ability to both build systems to avoid it and detect systems 
that encode it turns on statistics.”).  
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Allowing the structuring of such sensitive databases generates both 
privacy and security concerns. There are fears that information related to 
racial and other sensitive groupings will be abused, used for 
manipulation, or hacked and thereafter fall into the wrong hands. 
Therefore, obtaining such datasets as part of the auditing or even 
database structuring process is a liability of its own. However, the 
newness of scoring processes brings about unique discrimination-related 
issues. The likelihood that discrimination will unfold renders the 
collection and usage of such datasets of sensitive information a social 
necessity.135 Rather than blocking the collection and usage of such data, 
law should assure that the availability of this information will not end up 
exacerbating liberty-related concerns rather than mitigating them.136 
As this extended analysis of discrimination concerns related to 
protected groups comes to a close, note Table I below, which 
summarizes the forms of discrimination addressed throughout this 
section. 
 




Implicit Discrimination Disparate Impact 
“Masking” “Hidden Intent” 









“Blatant Proxies” [Wrongs of the Past] 
 
135. See Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1471–72 (2004) (noting that 
propositions for limiting the collection of such personal racial information have been struck down 
and further noting that courts have not struck down rules requiring the collection of such data). For 
an additional discussion of this proposition, see FORD, supra note 53, at 334.  
136. For a recent case, where the lack of a proper methodology for measuring disparate impact 
led to the failure of this claim, see EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 
2014). 
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III. DISCRIMINATION AND SCORING BEYOND PROTECTED 
GROUPS: A PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION 
Even given the vast advances of the recent generation, it is far too 
early to declare the arrival of a post-racial society.137 Many of the 
“classic” forms of discrimination which are premised upon or pertain to 
protected groups and minorities are still very much alive. However, 
engaging in a mental exercise to examine the meaning, troubles, and 
acceptable boundaries of discrimination beyond the notion of race—or 
other protected groups—is certainly important. Indeed, the scored 
society introduces novel and unique discrimination-related concerns. 
These concerns require the implementation of a separate set of policy 
steps, even if all the previously discussed issues are resolved. 
The notion of applying the term “discrimination” to a policy 
discussion that goes beyond race and other protected groups is not 
common practice. Scholars and policymakers considering the notion of 
discrimination (especially in the legal realm) quickly gravitate to a 
discussion which pertains to race. They will therefore examine whether 
the factor used to distinguish among individuals was race-related or 
whether the overall impact of the sorting process disadvantaged a racial 
minority group. Yet there are also other contexts in which the notion of 
discrimination comes to mind and protected groups are not involved. 
Discrimination-related arguments can take many forms in the scored 
society. Throughout their article, when contemplating the notion of 
discrimination, Professors Citron and Pasquale set forth several 
arguments which pertain to this general discussion as well: the two most 
dominant being the “negative spiral,”138 and the “arbitrariness-by-
algorithm”139 arguments. While the former focuses on the outcome of 
the scoring dynamic, the latter relates to concerns with the process. 
First is the “negative spiral” argument.140 The premise of this 
argument is that the scoring process generates extremely negative 
outcomes to some people, which are disproportionate to the actual 
differences among the individuals. The individual experiences this effect 
as a consequence of being a subject of a negative prediction. These 
dynamics will not be self-corrected, as they are misunderstood by the 
analysts studying the feedback of the scoring practices as mere 
reassurance of the scoring system’s precision. To explain, consider a 
137. For a critical discussion of this term, see FORD, supra note 53, at 338.  
138. Citron & Pasqual, supra note 1, at 32–33.  
139. Id. at 24. 
140. Id. at 32–33.  
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situation in which individuals are provided with a relatively low score 
and subsequently treated adversely. The low score was allocated in a 
response to a minor transgression, which results in a prediction 
regarding the individual’s limited ability to perform adequately in some 
future context. This low score leads to limited chances of obtaining 
employment, credit, or insurance—which are, at first, proportionate 
outcomes. 
However, the negative impact of the low score is not confined to 
these specific contexts or to a single event or time, which the individual 
can ultimately set aside and move forward. In many cases, Professors 
Citron and Pasquale argue, the effects of such lower scores have severe 
repercussions on the individual’s overall economic status and future 
prospects.141 This is due to the fact that one unfortunate event leads to 
another; for instance, the inability to obtain credit leads to other financial 
and social pitfalls, such as the inability to secure employment. The 
predictive analysis finding that a one-time encounter leads to classifying 
an individual as a high risk ends up proving accurate, as the latter 
negative outcomes indicate that the risk indeed materialized. 
Furthermore, the model’s predictive success is noted and the process is 
reinforced and continued. Thus, others will be similarly impacted. 
Yet a closer look at what has just been described should lead to the 
conclusion that the precise prediction did not result from the predictive 
accuracy of the scoring process. Rather than predicting, it is the score 
itself that generated the outcome and initiated a self-fulfilling prophecy; 
the granting of the low score itself led to the outcome the scoring system 
was supposed to predict! The correlation this process involved is non-
spurious, but the causation behind it is problematic. The scoring process 
is not merely measuring and predicting, but causing the effects 
measured. The “negative spiral” concern could also be articulated in 
terms of discrimination; an individual ends up suffering a problematic 
outcome as a consequence of the scoring system, while being treated 
unequally to others within his peer group. To some extent, it resembles 
the “segregation” argument against disparate impact—yet here the 
individual is a group of one. 
Note that the “negative spiral” need not be necessarily linked to the 
“classic” forms of discrimination which involve minorities and protected 
groups. Of course, when those adversely affected by this dynamic are 
part of a protected or historically disenfranchised group, these problems 
are compounded. However, even when removing this issue from racial 
141. Id. 
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or other protected contexts, the basic problematic outcome still follows; 
a group of individuals are adversely impacted as a result of the scoring 
process, and treated differently from their peers. 
Conceptualizing the potential “negative spiral” dynamic in 
discrimination terms is a helpful analytical exercise. Such 
conceptualization reveals that this concern might not be as severe as it 
initially sounds. As explained above, discrimination is considered a 
severe problem when it systematically impacts an entire group. Group 
discrimination removes the individual, which is part of the group, from 
the sources of power within society. His or her social contacts are 
powerless to assist, as they are inflicted with the same problems as well. 
In addition, harming the group impacts the individual’s self-confidence 
and generates other psychological harms, given the individual’s 
affiliation with said group.142 In other words, the severity of group 
discrimination results from negative dynamics unfolding in several 
dimensions—economic, social and psychological. 
With this understanding in mind, one must conclude that the damages 
inflicted on individuals by the “negative spiral” dynamics are 
substantially different than those caused by the discriminatory practices 
addressed above (which pertained to “protected groups”). The situation 
at hand inflicts harm on specific individuals, almost randomly. The 
individuals are indeed part of a group, but one that is synthetic by nature, 
of unclear boundaries and structured by an algorithm. It is not a group 
that the individual feels a strong affinity to, or that the public easily 
identifies as such.143 Therefore, group stigma need not attach, and the 
psychological damage caused will not be as negative. In addition and 
perhaps more importantly, others within this individual’s social group 
are not part of this negative dynamic. Thus, those harmed will have 
someone to turn to for help in stopping this downward spiral.144 These 
arguments cannot justify the wrongs caused to these individuals, but can 
strengthen the case that scoring must continue, nonetheless, while other 
steps are taken to soften their blow. In other words, the “negative spiral” 
does not feature outcomes that are substantially detrimental as to 
prohibit the actions of scoring firms, when these firms are meeting 
reasonable standards and exercising their legitimate preferences. After 
all, the firm’s actions in this context do not feature the morally 
unacceptable intentions discussed in the previous section. 
142. Alexander, supra note 38, at 185.  
143. Id.  
144. For a similar argument in the context of “general” discrimination theory, see Balkin, supra 
note 112, at 2359–60. 
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Regulators and scoring entities can take steps to limit this concern. 
However, it is questionable whether disclosure of the inner workings of 
the scoring process—the central remedy noted above—will assist in 
mitigating this problem. The statistical measures which led to the spiral 
and were used in scoring might prove sound to an external reviewer. A 
possible regulatory response might call for assuring that causation 
studies establish the relevancy of all factors used prior to launching 
scoring schemes. Note, however, that such an aggressive step might 
encumber the entire process, and is therefore not advisable.145 Yet the 
“negative spiral” dynamic might be mitigated by taking a different 
approach, for instance by assuring that independent scoring mechanisms 
are applied in different contexts. In such a case, errors in one context are 
not compounded. Indeed, the discrimination literature notes that severe 
problems mostly arise when the same form of discrimination is exercised 
in a variety of settings.146 Furthermore, encouraging greater competition 
between scoring systems in every sector will also limit this spiraling 
dynamic, for similar reasons. Different firms might apply different 
scoring systems and thus lead to varied results. Unfortunately, we are 
witnessing the opposite dynamic of growing concentration in scoring. 
Scoring carried out in terms of credit is spreading to contexts of 
insurance and employment as well.147 Thus, recent laws limiting such 
horizontal spreading of scoring seem to be a step in the right direction.148 
Finally, in important instances, such as those involving healthcare, 
government will need to assure that the scoring mechanism does not 
undermine the individuals’ ability to gain access to essential social 
needs, thus halting the negative spiral. To conclude, conceptualizing the 
“negative spiral” concern in discrimination terms is helpful in ultimately 
rejecting it as one that generates a severe, unique and incurable problem 
with the scoring mechanism, in the event the solutions noted are applied. 
The second form of discrimination-based argument addressed in The 
Scored Society is that of “arbitrariness-by-algorithm.”149 This argument, 
partially attributed to FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez (who also refers 
145. For a discussion as to the problems and limited utility of requiring that causation theories are 
to be established prior to including them in a predictive model, see Zarsky, Transparent 
Predicitions, supra note 65, at 1562, 1567; SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 19, at 61–72 
(2014) (discussing the limited role causation is destined to play in the age of “big data”). 
146. Alexander, supra note 38, at 198. 
147. See Lea Shepard, Seeking Solutions to Financial History Discrimination, 46 CONN. L. REV. 
993, 1003–04 (2014). 
148. Id. at 1011. 
149. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 24. 
 
                                                     
19 - Zarsky_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/2014  6:34 PM 
2014] DISCRIMINATION IN THE SCORED SOCIETY 1409 
to it as “Data Determinism”),150 states that the scoring dynamic is 
problematic because it judges individuals based on what inferences and 
correlations suggest they might do, rather than for things they have 
actually done. In the scored society, individuals who are similar in all 
relevant aspects are treated differently. Scoring relies upon considering 
anecdotal differences, which do not translate into actual differences in 
reality. Or, from another perspective, the concept of equality is 
constantly violated by arbitrarily grouping together different individuals 
and treating them similarly. The fact that evidence constantly circulates 
as to these outcomes might render the firm reckless in its disregard to 
treat equal individuals equally. (I set aside the thorny question of 
whether private firms operating in a public sphere are even subjected to 
a duty to do so.) Note that this argument does not necessarily call for 
examining the negative systematic outcomes the process might inflict. 
The severity of this concern is substantially undermined upon 
returning to this Article’s foundational assumptions regarding the 
scoring process and its accuracy. This Article assumes that the scoring 
process is premised upon non-spurious (yet non-universal) correlations. 
Such correlations feature imperfect generalization. Given their nature, in 
some instances, the scoring will predict that individuals will take actions 
they ultimately would not have carried out. Yet the fact that a ranking 
process includes errors does not necessarily render it discriminatory if 
the errors are random and reasonable.151 Indeed, any system providing 
for the allocation of benefits and burdens will include errors. It is unclear 
that a scoring system is more error-prone than any other. Even a system 
which allows for considering every individual on the merits will lead to 
mistakes, and there is no assurance that the mistakes of this latter 
process will be less severe. 
Therefore, operating under the assumptions mentioned and taking a 
comparative view, the scored society is not necessarily drastically 
random or arbitrary, and thus unfair. It merely appears to be. The lack of 
clear and apparent reasons for actions, when joined with the fact that the 
process is guaranteed to produce errors, generates popular discontent. 
150. Edith Ramirez, FTC Chairwoman, Keynote Address at the Tech. Policy Inst. Aspen Forum, 
The Privacy Challenges of Big Data: A View from the Lifeguard’s Chair 7–8 (Aug. 19, 2013), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-challenges-
big-data-view-lifeguard%E2%80%99s-chair/130819bigdataaspen.pdf. 
151. Indeed, the morality of the process is compromised when the errors are not distributed 
equally and a specific social segment, such as the poor, is subject to a higher rate of errors. See, e.g., 
Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data, FOREIGN POLICY 4 (May 9, 2013, 3:49 PM), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/09/think_again_big_data (discussing Boston’s Street 
Bump App).  
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This is as opposed to other, accepted, courses of action which are 
premised on human discretion. In these latter situations the process is 
socially acceptable, as the existence of errors is not necessarily apparent. 
Yet the problem that equals will be treated differently exists with both 
options. 
There is no real reason for society to concede to the visceral 
discontent scoring generates, set policy accordingly, and reject the 
process altogether. The discontent possibly associated with the so-called 
arbitrary nature of scoring might result from the fact that the process 
inherently and ex ante accepts that it will include substantial errors; 
errors which will cause real people severe harm. Yet what the reader 
must bear in mind is that alternative strategies will nonetheless introduce 
mistakes (a point FTC Commissioner Ramirez recognizes as well)152—
and even errors that are more frequent, or systematic by nature.153 
Therefore, this latter discrimination-based argument does not carry 
sufficient analytical weight to transform it from a popular complaint to a 
legitimate point in a policy discussion. It also does not entail any 
perceivable intrinsic moral wrong, or evidence of any insult. 
Rather than insulting, the process of scoring might lead to some 
psychological benefits. For this point, I note an interesting argument set 
forth by Professor Fred Schauer in the similar context of profiling, which 
might have some relevance to the current discussion.154 Schauer explains 
that when an individual is indicated as a higher risk in a process which 
treats her differently based on her actions exclusively and directly, she 
may experience severe psychological anguish. However, when an 
individual is indicated as a higher risk by a profile which considers her 
as part of a larger group, she need not suffer such psychological harm. 
Rather, the individual might convince herself that attributing the 
negative score to her is merely a technical (even arbitrary) error resulting 
from wrongfully configuring the group’s traits. The same might also be 
said of decisions-via-algorithms. The seemingly arbitrary scoring 
process might generate anxiety for some, but comfort for many others, 
given the ability to reflect the blame of failure. 
The effects Schauer notes are merely psychological. Yet they are 
destined to have a broad impact, as they pertain to all individuals who 
receive a lower score, not only those treated unfairly (who might be 
152. Ramirez, supra note 150, at 8.  
153. For a discussion of the importance of considering alternatives of automated selection 
processes so to properly balance the understanding of the issues at hand, see Tal Z. Zarsky, 
Governmental Data Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 285, 310 (2011). 
154. SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 290–91.  
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quite limited in number). The psychological effects (or rather, lack 
thereof) impact the individual’s ability to set aside a specific financial 
setback that results from a negative score (be it merited or mistaken) and 
move onward.155 Thus, this psychological response might have a 
substantial positive real world effect. It presents a strong argument as to 
the benefits of the so called-arbitrary process scoring brings about when 
compared to other individualized alternatives. Again, it is the 
introduction of the vast literature on discrimination into the big data and 
scoring discussion which brings this interesting argument to light. 
In addition to the “spiral” and “arbitrariness” arguments, other forms 
of discrimination might manifest in a scored society. Scoring might 
generate novel negative stereotypes and stigma attaching to social 
groups and personality traits. It might also discriminate on the basis of 
immutable personal traits, thus creating an additional set of 
discrimination-based concerns. These are both intriguing issues, yet 
beyond the current discussion. 
CONCLUSION: SCORING AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
The rise of the scored society brings several discrimination-based 
concerns to mind. This Article takes initial steps in articulating these 
issues, while striving to connect novel technological and business 
practices to the already existing vast literature on the troubles, harms of 
and response to discrimination. The Article shows that beyond mere 
intuition, and as argued by Professors Citron and Pasquale, these new 
practices generate unique concerns which must be urgently considered. 
Given the evidence as to the connection between scoring practices 
and discrimination, this Article could lead to two conclusions. First, one 
can argue that engaging in scoring methods should be categorically 
prohibited, or at least substantially limited. Second, one might note that, 
in some instances involving scoring, discrimination-based concerns may 
arise, but these can be properly countered and balanced through 
specifically-tailored responses. This Article’s central premise is that the 
latter set of conclusions should be applied. Designed and understood 
correctly, the discrimination-based concerns are manageable even in 
view of scoring. 
Beyond catering to our general social aspiration to promote science 
and efficiency, scoring should be maintained and possibly even 
promoted for yet another reason. Elsewhere I have forcefully argued that 
155. Id.  
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to some extent, scoring systems premised upon automated predictive 
modeling can limit severe discrimination-based concerns, especially 
those involving race. This latter form of discrimination is often practiced 
subconsciously. Yet automated decision-making systems provide the 
ability to limit the effects of human discretion, and the prejudices it 
involves, on the decision-making processes.156 In addition, a 
standardized process carried out uniformly through the use of computer 
software and hardware would be easier to supervise. Here, the scoring 
entity can assure that the officials applying the score are not abusing 
their discretion to harm minorities, but rather sticking to their scripted 
protocol. Thus, given these two important attributes, the scored society 
can potentially prove to be a fair and equal one.157 This will only occur, 
however, if the new forms of discrimination here addressed are fully 
acknowledged, and thereafter properly and quickly resolved. 
 
156. Zarsky, supra note 5, at 27–29. But cf. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 4 (disagreeing 
with the argument voiced in the text).  
157. Others have provided additional reasons why racial discrimination concerns might diminish 
in the age of big data—most notably Lior Strahilevitz. See generally Lior J. Strahilevitz, Privacy 
Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 364 (2008) (explaining that increasing the 
availability of negative information regarding individuals will reduce decision makers’ reliance on 
information regarding groups, which in turn often constitutes racial statistical discrimination). For a 
review of this strand in the literature, see Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First 
Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent, TEX. L. REV. 34 n.191 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409074. 
 
                                                     
